Is the Final Chapter of the Metaphysics of morals also the Final Chapter of the Practical Postulates? by Kahn, Samuel
Title: Is the Final Chapter of the Metaphysics of morals also the Final Chapter of the 
Practical Postulates? 
Abstract. In this paper I trace the arc of Kant’s critical stance on the belief in God, 
beginning with the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and culminating in the final chapter of 
the Metaphysics of morals (1797). I argue that toward the end of his life, Kant changed 
his views on two important topics. First, despite his stinging criticism of it in the Critique 
of Pure Reason, by the time of the Metaphysics of morals, Kant seems to endorse the 
physico-theological argument. Second, some time around the publication of the 
Metaphysics of morals, Kant seems to move away from the argument for the practical 
postulates.  
In this paper I trace the arc of Kant’s critical stance on the belief in God, 
beginning with the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and culminating in the “Doctrine of 
the methods of ethics,” the final chapter of the Metaphysics of morals (1797).  I argue that i
it is only by examining closely the “Doctrine of the methods of ethics” that we can 
appreciate a fundamental shift in Kant’s views on the existence of God, a shift that has 
gone unnoticed in recent discussions because of the relative neglect of the Metaphysics of 
morals and especially of the final chapter of this work. 
One of the things in the Critique of Pure Reason for which Kant became famous 
was his attack on traditional arguments for the existence of God. He begins by dividing 
these arguments into three kinds: (1) ontological arguments, based solely on the concept 
of God, (2) cosmological arguments, based solely on the existence of a world, and (3) 
physico-theological arguments, based on the particular constitution of the actual world. 
Kant then subjects each of these arguments to withering criticisms, criticisms that some 
think earned him the name “the all-destroying Kant” from Moses Mendelssohn 
(1729-1786).  ii
However, Kant also puts forth a positive argument for the existence of God in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. In broad strokes, the argument goes like this: (1) morality 
commands us to realize a world in which we are perfectly virtuous and in which 
happiness is doled out in accordance with virtue; (2) it is rational to try to realize 
something only if it has a ground in reality; (3) the world that morality commands us to 
realize can have a ground in reality only if God exists (and the soul is immortal); and 
therefore (4) to fulfill the commands of morality we must bring ourselves to believe in 
God. Kant concludes from this that the existence of God is a “practical postulate.”  iii
 Both Kant’s negative arguments and his positive arguments for the existence of 
God have been the subject of much controversy in the secondary literature. Recent 
debates have been spurred on by Wood, who has given detailed, book-length assessments 
of Kant’s criticism of the ontological argument and of Kant’s practical postulates (in 
Kant’s Rational Theology and Kant’s Moral Religion, respectively). One of the things that 
is notable about Kant’s practical postulates and that is brought out especially in the work 
of Guyer on this subject is the evolution of the arguments. Kant sets forth the practical 
postulates in all three Critiques as well as in many of his other major works. But the 
articulations of the arguments are often subtly different. Nonetheless, the general 
contours of the arguments remain the same. This suggests that although Kant was not 
entirely satisfied with the details of the arguments, he continued to think that any 
difficulties therewith could be smoothed out, that the arguments, and especially the 
argument about God, could be made to work. Such, anyway, seems to be the general 
consensus on this subject in the secondary literature. 
 However, I argue that a close inspection of the last chapter of the Metaphysics of 
morals reveals otherwise. In fact, a close reading of this under-utilized text reveals that 
toward the end of his life, Kant changed his views on two important topics. First, despite 
his stinging criticism of it in the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, by the time of the 
Metaphysics of morals, almost 20 years later, Kant endorses the physico-theological 
argument. Second, in the “Doctrine of the methods of ethics,” Kant jettisons the argument 
for the practical postulates. Indeed, in the Metaphysics of morals, instead of arguing that 
morality commands us to do something that, in turn, requires us to believe in the 
existence of God, Kant argues that we have independent grounds for believing in the 
existence of God (to wit, the physico-theological argument) and therefore that it is 
rational to try to realize the kind of world that morality commands us to realize.  
I. 
  The Critique of Pure Reason: Kant’s Early Critical Views on the Physico-
theological Argument Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason criticism of the ontological 
argument is well known. He claims that the ontological argument presupposes that 
existence is a “real predicate,”  which it is not (KrV, AA A598/B626).   Kant’s argument iv v
for this claim is that when one thinks of a thing, one adds nothing to it by virtue of 
thinking of it as existing (KrV, AA A597/B625).  One of the reasons this criticism is so vi
well known is that it has given rise to a series of modern debates, like the debate about 
negative singular existentials.  I do not intend to take a stand on whether Kant is right.  vii viii
It hopefully will suffice merely to point out that the ontological argument, which usually 
is traced back to Anselm’s version of it in his Proslogion, and criticisms of the argument, 
which arguably begin with Gaunilo’s response to Anselm, continue to be an area of 
exploration today.  ix
 Kant’s attack on the cosmological argument is multipronged.  First, he claims that x
even if the cosmological argument could establish the existence of some purposive being, 
it does not establish that this being has all the attributes the theists want to attribute to it. 
To establish that the being is a Supremely Perfect Being, the cosmological argument 
relies tacitly on the ontological argument, which Kant takes himself already to have 
defused (KrV, AA A606/B633-A609/B637; cf. KrV, AA A611/B639-A614/B642). Kant’s 
argument for this relies on separating the inference to the existence of a sui generis being 
from the inference to the existence of an ens realissimum, a most real being (KrV, AA 
A605/B633); the latter inference relies, according to Kant, on the ontological argument.   xi
However, Kant thinks that the first inference is subject to a suite of problems itself (KrV, 
AA A609/B637-A610/B639). Describing those problems constitutes the second part of 
his attack on the cosmological argument (KrV, AA A609/B637-A610/B639). It is not my 
goal to establish that Kant’s attack on the cosmological argument works.  The xii
cosmological argument, which is often traced back to Plato’s Laws, continues to be an 
area of active research.  My goal is simply to establish that at the time of the Critique of xiii
Pure Reason, Kant did not think that the cosmological argument worked. 
 For my purposes, Kant’s most important remarks about proofs of God’s existence 
come in his assessment of the physico-theological argument.  The physico-theological xiv
argument, like the ontological argument and the cosmological argument, has a long 
history (it is often traced back to Plato) and still finds supporters today.  Hume attacked xv
the argument in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. But the Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion was not published until 1779, and there was some delay in 
its translation into German. So it seems unlikely that Kant had read this work by the time 
of the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason.  The version of the physico-xvi
theological argument that Kant reconstructs in order to attack it runs as follows: 
1) Everywhere in the world there are clear signs of an order according to 
determinate aim, carried out with great wisdom, and in a whole of 
indescribable manifoldness in content as well as of unbounded magnitude 
in scope. 2) This purposive order is quite foreign to the things of the 
world, and pertains to them only contingently, i.e., the natures of different 
things could not by themselves agree in so many united means to 
determinate final aims, were they not quite properly chosen for and 
predisposed to it through a principle of rational order grounded on ideas, 
3) Thus there exists a sublime and wise cause (or several), which must be 
the cause of the world not merely as an all-powerful nature working 
blindly through fecundity, but as an intelligence, through freedom. 4) The 
unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation 
of the parts of the world as members of an artful structure, inferred with 
certainty wherever our observation reaches, but beyond that with 
probability in accordance with all principles of analogy.  
(KrV, AA A625/B653-A626/B654) 
The basic idea behind this argument is that we can see “clear signs” of purposive order in 
the world, and a purposive order presupposes a purposeful creator. 
 Kant criticizes this argument on three fronts. First, he points out that the physico-
theological argument warrants at most the conclusion that there is a highest architect of 
the world, not a highest creator (KrV, AA A627/B655). The idea is that the physico-
theological argument begins with a premise about the particular way in which the world 
has been put together.  It does not begin with a premise about the particular substance 
from which the world is made. Accordingly, the strongest conclusion warranted is that 
there was a purposeful architect of the world. But this architect might have been limited 
in what s/he could do by the materials available. Indeed, the inference that the world is 
purposive and therefore must have a purposeful designer proceeds by analogy with 
human artifacts. But when humans design and build things, they are limited by the 
materials available to them. So even if we could have insight into whether the substance 
of the world was chosen by design (we cannot on Kant’s account, but even if we could) 
the analogy that is central to the physico-theological argument can support only the 
inference to a highest architect. 
 Kant’s second criticism of the physico-theological argument is that the argument 
does not warrant inferring the existence of any determinate being much less an all-perfect 
one (KrV, AA A628/B656).  The idea here is that our insight into the world does not (and 
cannot) warrant concluding that the designer of the world is all-perfect, for we do not 
know (amongst other things) whether this is the best of all possible worlds. Or, more 
accurately, if we do know that this is the best of all possible worlds, we do not learn that 
it is so from looking around. Therefore, we are not warranted in concluding that the 
architect of the world is the best of all possible architects simply by looking around. 
 Kant’s third and final objection to the physico-theological argument is that it 
makes a hidden appeal to the cosmological argument, which in turn makes a hidden 
appeal to the ontological argument (KrV, AA A629/B657-A630/B658). Kant says that 
proponents of the physico-theological argument infer the existence of an all-perfect 
creator of the world despite the fact that, as his previous two objections show, they are 
not warranted in so doing. He concludes that they must be making a tacit appeal to the 
cosmological argument. Because both the cosmological argument and the ontological 
argument on which the former (supposedly) depends already have been seen to fail on 
Kant’s account, he concludes that the physico-theological argument does not work. 
 This concludes my examination of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason criticisms of 
the traditional arguments for the existence of God in general and of the physico-
theological argument in particular. I am not going to assess the philosophical plausibility 
of Kant’s arguments.  The main thing to see from this is that in the Critique of Pure xvii
Reason, Kant was arguing against the physico-theological argument. I turn now to the 
Critique of Pure Reason doctrine of the practical postulates and, in particular, the 
postulate of the existence of God. 
II. 
The Critique of Pure Reason: Kant’s Early Critical Views on the Practical 
Postulate of the Existence of God Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason argument for the 
practical postulates occurs in the second section of the “Canon of Pure Reason.”  The xviii
basic argument rests on an inference that something is so because it ought to be so (KrV, 
AA A806/B834).  That is, as Kant represents it, the crux of the argument rests on the xix
use of the “ought implies can” principle: because we ought to X, we must be able to X, 
and for X to be possible, it must have a ground in actuality.   xx
 The argument begins with the claim that the moral law commands us to realize a 
moral world (KrV, AA A806/B836). A moral world is one that is in conformity with all 
moral laws; it is a world in which everyone’s freedom has “thoroughgoing systematic 
unity in itself as well as with the freedom of everyone else” (KrV, AA A808/B836). But 
Kant says that a moral world is not yet the highest good; a moral world is incomplete.  
A moral world is a world in which everyone is worthy of happiness. To complete 
the highest good, people who are worthy of happiness ought to be happy, and people who 
are unworthy of happiness ought not to be happy (KrV, AA A813/B841). Kant concludes, 
“happiness in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings… alone constitutes 
the highest good of a world into which we must without exception transpose 
ourselves” (KrV, AA A814/B842). 
Now if we ought to bring about a world in which the highest good is realized, 
then it must be possible to bring about such a world. But the only world of which the 
senses provide us any evidence is the world of appearances, so we must assume that the 
world will be brought about through our conduct in the sensible world. However, two 
problems arise here.  
First, the highest good can be hoped for only if there is a highest reason that 
commands in accordance with the moral law and is the cause of nature (KrV, AA A810/
B838). The idea here is that the conjunction of the systematic unity required by a moral 
world with the systematic distribution of happiness is extremely complicated. It is so 
complicated that it rationally can be believed to be possible only if there is a God and, in 
particular, a God who has engineered the world in such a way that good behavior will be 
consummated with happiness (and bad behavior with unhappiness).  The main reason xxi
this conjunction is so complicated seems to be that people do not always act in 
accordance with the moral law. Because people do not always act morally, the ultimate 
distribution of happiness does not depend merely on the laws of nature or merely on the 
causality of actions themselves and their relation to morality (KrV, AA A810/B838). One 
of the underlying ideas here might be that bad people often get in the way of the carrying 
out of the best intentions. So if the moral law commands us to realize the highest good, 
we must constrain ourselves (on pain of irrationality) to believe in a God who corrects for 
this. 
Second, given what we have seen of the world thus far, it is extremely improbable 
that the world is so happily constituted. Therefore, the belief in God and, thus, the 
rationality of pursuing the highest good can be maintained only if there is a future life 
(KrV, AA A811/B839). To simplify, the idea seems to be something like this: belief in 
God is necessary but not sufficient to make rational the pursuit of the highest good. The 
problem is that there is too much countervailing evidence; there is too much evidence that 
the highest good will not be realized. Vicious people are often happy; virtuous people 
often suffer. So we must constrain ourselves (on pain of irrationality) to believe that there 
is a future life. It is in the future life that the highest good actually will be realized.  xxii
 It is perhaps worth wondering whether Kant can give a justification for his appeal 
to “ought implies can” in this argument. That is, it is perhaps worth wondering whether 
Kant can justify inferring that we must be able to pursue the highest good because we 
ought to (and therefore that we ought to believe in God and a future life) rather than the 
other way around (that we have no duty to promote the highest good because its 
realization is impossible).  But as in the previous section, my goal in this section is not xxiii
to assess the philosophical plausibility of Kant’s arguments.  The main goal is simply xxiv
to see that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant thinks that we ought to believe in the 
existence of God because morality commands us to pursue an end that we rationally can 
believe to be possible only if God exists. 
III.  
The Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment: 
Kant’s Evolving Views on the Practical Postulate of the Existence of God and the 
Physico-theological Argument Kant’s views on the practical postulates and on the 
physico-theological argument evolved over the course of time. This can be seen in the 
Critique of Practical Reason, published in 1788, only one year after the second edition of 
the Critique of Pure Reason. It also can be seen in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
published two years later in 1790.  
 The Critique of Practical Reason contains Kant’s most systematic exposition of 
the practical postulates. The basic structure of the argument remains the same: it infers 
that something is the case because something ought to be the case. However, the 
particular justifications for the practical postulates have changed. Now the postulate of 
immortality is needed to guarantee the possibility of moral perfection instead of the 
possibility of happiness in proportion to morality. The idea is that as sensible beings, 
humans cannot attain holiness, complete conformity of the will with the moral law, which 
is what the highest good requires. The best we can do is an infinite progression toward 
holiness, and for this we need an infinite time and, hence, immortality (KpV, AA 
5:122-123).  The postulate of the existence of God is needed to guarantee the possibility xxv
of the distribution of happiness being proportional to virtue. The idea is that the only way 
there could be a necessary connection between virtue and happiness is if there were an 
omnipotent, omniscient, all-benevolent God who created nature and its laws (KpV, AA 
5:124-6).  This argument is repeated in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU, AA xxvi
5:450). 
 The other thing that has changed is Kant’s attitude toward the physico-theological 
argument. To be sure, even in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant did not seem to regard 
the physico-theological argument as resting entirely on “sophistry,” as he regards the 
other two arguments by the time of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU, AA 
5:476). Even in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant tells us that the physico-theological 
argument “always deserves to be named with respect” (KrV, AA A623/B651). The point 
of the objections to the physico-theological argument discussed above is to “tone down 
the language of a scornful sophist to the tone of moderation and modesty of a belief that 
is sufficient to comfort us” (KrV, AA A624/B652). Nonetheless, Kant’s change in attitude 
toward the physico-theological argument can be seen in two ways. 
 First, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant supports rather than attacks 
the physico-theological argument.  For example, he claims that reflective consideration of 
nature certainly will give us “sufficient reason” to infer the existence of an intelligent 
designer (KU, AA 5:439); that the physico-theological proof furnishes us with the 
concept of a highest understanding as world-cause “completely in according to principles 
of the reflecting power of judgment, i.e., in accordance with the constitution of our 
(human) cognitive faculty” (KU, AA 5:476); and that inferring an intelligent designer 
“from the great purposiveness of natural forms and their relation” is justified (KU, AA 
5:480). To be sure, he does not think that we are warranted in this way in inferring the 
existence of a “supreme, i.e., intelligent independent being” (KU, AA 5:476). But he 
does think that the physico-theological argument is successful in taking us “beyond the 
boundaries of nature as the sum of objects of the senses” despite its empirical starting 
point (KU, AA 5:476). 
 Second and more striking, Kant now brings the physico-theological argument and 
the practical postulate of the existence of God together.  The following passage is 
illustrative: 
…the fact that rational beings in the actual world find ample material for 
physical teleology there (although this was not necessary) serves as the 
desired confirmation of the moral argument, insofar as nature is thus 
capable of displaying something analogous to the (moral) ideas of reason.  
(KU, AA 5:479) 
Thus, the physico-theological argument has a positive role now: it bolsters up the moral 
argument provided by the practical postulate of the existence of God. The practical 
postulate would stand on its own, but the physico-theological does give a desired 
confirmation of the postulate. And the relationship between the physico-theological 
argument and the practical postulate of the existence of God is not a one-way street; it is 
mutualistic. The physico-theological argument gives evidence for the rectitude of the 
practical postulate, and the practical postulate completes the physico-theological 
argument.  In particular, the practical postulate fills the gap that in the Critique of Pure xxvii
Reason was filled by the cosmological argument. Let me explain. 
Recall that in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant concluded that because the 
physico-theological argument does not warrant inferring the existence of a supreme, all-
perfect God, supporters of the physico-theological argument must make a tacit appeal to 
the cosmological argument. Now in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the move 
from inferring the existence of an intelligent designer to inferring the existence of a 
supreme, all-perfect God is made by means of the practical postulate of the existence of 
God: 
If one minimizes the problem that a physicotheology is supposed to solve, 
then its solution seems easy. That is, if one reduces the concept of a deity 
to that of an intelligent being that can be conceived by us… then physical 
teleology can make significant claims to the distinction of establishing a 
theology. But if it is demanded that we show what drives us and even 
justifies us in adding those supplements [such as all-perfect to the concept 
of this deity]… on closer examination we would see there actually lies in 
us a priori an idea of a highest being, resting on a very different use of 
reason (its practical use), which drives us to amplify physical teleology’s 
defective representation of the original ground of the ends of nature…  
(KU, AA 5:438)  
To summarize: Kant’s ideas about the physico-theological argument and about the 
practical postulate seem to shift between the Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1781, 
the Critique of Practical Reason, published in 1788, and the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment in 1790. In the Critique of Practical Reason, we see Kant justifying the 
postulate of immortality on the grounds that we need an infinite amount of time to attain 
moral perfection–a marked shift from the Critique of Pure Reason argument, which 
seems to justify immortality on the grounds that it is required for the distribution of 
happiness in the highest good to be realized. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
we see Kant endorsing the physico-theological argument, albeit within very strict 
confines. More striking and more relevant for my purposes, we also see Kant putting the 
physico-theological argument together with the practical postulates in a way that could 
not have been foreseen based on the discussions in the Critique of Pure Reason and the 
Critique of Practical Reason. On the one hand, the physico-theological argument now 
provides empirical confirmation for the moral argument in the practical postulates. On the 
other hand, the practical postulates now shore up the gap in the physico-theological 
argument in its inference of the existence of an all-perfect God from the purposiveness in 
nature–a gap that in the Critique of Pure Reason was filled by the sophistical 
cosmological argument and, thereby, the equally sophistical ontological argument. 
IV.  
1790-1797: Filling the Gap Between the Critique of the Power of Judgment 
and the Metaphysics of morals There are two things to which I would like to draw 
attention with regard to Kant’s intellectual development between 1790 and 1797. The first 
is Kant’s seeming ambivalence toward the postulate of immortality.  This can be seen xxviii
already in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. For example, in the section on 
ethicotheology (§86) Kant explains in detail how God’s existence and different properties 
(omnipotence, omniscience, etc.) can be argued for based on moral considerations about 
the highest good but does not even mention immortality (KU, AA 5:442-5).  Indeed, xxix
whereas the postulate of the existence of God has its own section (§87) the treatment of 
the postulate of immortality is largely unexplained, relegated to a few cursory lines.   xxx
 However, Kant’s relative neglect of the postulate of immortality is even more 
marked in his 1793 Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In the opening pages 
of this work, Kant rehearses the argument for the postulate of the existence of God 
without so much as a hint at the postulate of immortality. He tells us about  
…the idea of a highest good in the world, for whose possibility we must 
assume a higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent being who alone can 
unite the two elements of this good. 
(RGV, AA 6:05) 
Here Kant tells us that the possibility of the highest good requires assuming the existence 
of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God who can ensure that happiness and virtue (the 
“two elements” in this quotation) are distributed proportionately. But he does not tell us 
in this passage that the possibility of the highest good requires assuming also the 
existence of a future world: the postulate of immortality is left unaccounted for. Indeed, 
Kant tells us that the postulate of the existence of God is needed for the realization of the 
highest good in “this world” (my emphasis) both in the quotation above and in a footnote 
appended to the passage from which the quotation above is excerpted, a footnote in 
which he spells out the argument for the postulate of the existence of God in more detail 
(again without mention of the postulate of immortality).   xxxi
 Even more interesting, in part two of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason Kant seems to repudiate his 1788 Critique of Practical Reason argument for the 
postulate of immortality (noted above). Recall that according to this argument 
immortality must be assumed in order to make possible the moral perfection enjoined by 
the moral law. But at RGV, AA 6:65-8, Kant tells us that a change in disposition is 
sufficient for moral goodness and therefore “notwithstanding his permanent deficiency, a 
human being can still expect to be generally well-pleasing to God, at whatever point in 
time his existence be cut short” (RGV, AA 6:67).  
Similarly, at RGV, AA 6:73-6, only a few pages later in the Akademie edition, 
Kant seems to turn against his 1781 Critique of Pure Reason argument for the postulate 
of immortality (also noted above). Recall that according to this argument immortality 
must be assumed in order to ensure that happiness is distributed in accordance with 
virtue. But in this section of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant 
claims that moral evil requires infinite punishment from an omnipotent lawgiver and then 
goes on to ask 
…whether, by means of the very concept of moral conversion, we can 
think that situation as entailing such ills as the new human being, whose 
disposition is good, can regard as having been incurred by himself (in a 
different context) and, [therefore], as punishment whereby satisfaction is 
rendered to divine justice.  
(RGV, AA 6:73-4) 
Kant is asking whether moral conversion on his (new) theory renders obsolete the 
rationale he advanced for the postulate of immortality in the Critique of Pure Reason–and 
he goes on to argue in this passage that it does. 
 Kant’s seeming ambivalence to the postulate of immortality as documented here 
is perhaps less surprising when considered in light of what he says in some of his 
unpublished work. For example, in R8101, Kant claims that although we must believe in 
God and a future life out of a moral need, the faith that is thereby engendered in the 
immortality of the soul “is only a belief in the second rank. For it is not necessary that we 
exist… eternally, but only that so long as we live we conduct ourselves so as to be worthy 
of life” (Refl, AA 19:644).  It is notable that R8101 is usually dated to just this period xxxii
of Kant’s life.  
However, if we trust Kant’s students’ transcriptions of his metaphysics lectures as 
accurate representations of Kant’s own views, then Kant’s doubts about the postulate of 
immortality can be seen to predate this reflection. For example, in his 1783 lectures on 
metaphysics, Kant objects to the idea that a distribution that balances happiness in 
accordance with morality requires assuming the immortality of the soul. He argues that 
for some, this balance might be met in this life; for others, it might not be met in this life, 
but it might require only an additional 100 years or so rather than an eternity: 
But if we allow a future compensation it does not at all follow that this 
will be eternal. Now can we actually demand an eternal reward for our few 
virtues? And if we also wanted to have a myriad of years which then 
would pass, how would that help us? Finally, this proof also shows only 
that the future life will be particular. For children, idiots, and the wholly 
stupid, people whose lives are neither morally worthy nor morally 
unworthy, are excluded according to this proof, or at least are not included 
in it. 
      (V-Met/Mron, AA 29:917) 
Curiously, Kant goes on in the next pages of this passage to propose an entirely new 
argument for the postulate of immortality. That is, Kant says in these pages that the 
practical postulate of immortality attaches to the idea that if there were no immortality, 
then the moral law would have insufficient incentive: 
That human beings are bound to act honestly and to be good is an 
apodictic proposition. Only immortality can provide incentives for this. 
Therefore it is a practical postulate that the soul is immortal… Although 
this cannot be counted among the scientific proofs, for all that it has 
strength. For with it I bring the opponent to a practical absurdity <ad 
absurdum practicum>.     
(V-Met/Mron, AA 29:918-9) 
Of course, it must be remembered that these lecture notes were not written by Kant 
himself. But this attack on the idea that immortality is needed to ensure that happiness is 
distributed in proportion to virtue is not unique to the Mrongovius lecture notes on 
metaphysics. The same attack (the attack hinging on the claim that for some, the balance 
of happiness or virtue is met in this life while for others it might require only a finite 
rather than an infinite afterlife) can be found in the L1-Pölitz lecture notes on metaphysics 
(V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28:289-91) and also in the K2-Heinze lecture notes on metaphysics 
(V-Met-K2/Heinze, AA 28:767).  The fact that the attack shows up repeatedly lends xxxiii
credence to the idea that it is representative.  
 However, Kant continued to play with the argument for the postulate of 
immortality in his unpublished reflections from around the time of the Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason. For example, in R6432, which is usually dated to 1790-5, 
Kant argues as follows: 
This law [viz., the moral law] as a principle of wisdom leads our reason in 
its practical use to the final end of a highest wisdom: the greatest 
happiness combined with virtue as the final end of all things, which, 
however, so far as we can see makes necessary an eternity of our existence 
and a moral author of the world for realizing the constitution of the world 
that is requisite for that.    
(Refl, AA 18:714)  xxxiv
Moreover, by 1796 Kant seems to have regained faith in the postulate of immortality (at 
least temporarily). This can be seen by appeal to his Proclamation of the imminent 
conclusion of a treaty of perpetual peace in philosophy. For example, in a section titled 
“On the Super-sensible Objects of Our knowledge,” Kant argues that these objects 
include “immortality, as a state in which man’s weal or woe is to be allotted to him in 
proportion to his moral worth”  (VNAEF, AA 8:418). Of course, it should be noted that 
this claim hearkens back to the argument made in the Critique of Pure Reason, perhaps 
signifying Kant’s enduring dissatisfaction with the Critique of Practical Reason argument 
about perfect virtue requiring immortality (eschewed in the Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason). But the point is that Kant seems unambiguously to be 
committing himself to the postulate of immortality in his published work as late as 1796. 
 Plainly more could be said about Kant’s attitude to the postulate of immortality in 
the 1790s. But I would like to put that down for now and to pick up another thread, the 
second thing to which I mentioned I would like to draw attention in the opening 
paragraph of this section. As noted in the previous section of this paper, in the 1790 
Critique of the Power of Judgment we see Kant putting the physico-theological argument 
and the postulate of the existence of God together. The conjunction of these two 
arguments is, on Kant’s account, a happy one: the two arguments prop each other up. 
 I simply would like to point out that Kant continued to play with this idea in both 
his unpublished and his published writing after the 1790 publication of the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment. For example, in R6451, which is usually dated to 1790-5, Kant tells 
us that the physico-theological argument works together with the moral argument for the 
postulate of the existence of God. The first establishes a being of great perfection; the 
second establishes that this being is a moral being: 
First, the representation for the world as a system of the nexus finalis 
physici… Thus a rational primordial being, but not yet God, since the 
concept of the perfection of the world drawn from experience does not 
suffice for that. Now, the representation of the world as a system of final 
moral causes [systematis caussarum finalium moralium]  for the highest xxxv
good. For the human being, who is a member of the nexu finalis physico, 
but who finds in himself a principle of the higher nexus finalis, will also 
relate his existence with respect to that higher nexus to that same rational 
author… Thereby is the assumption of a living God as a moral being and 
thus also as an all-sufficient being accepted.       
(Refl, AA 18:723) 
Even more decisively, in his 1791 On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in 
Theodicy Kant makes a similar claim in an important footnote: 
…when art proves itself adequate to ideas the possibility of which 
surpasses every insight of human reason (e.g. when means and ends 
reciprocally produce one another, as in organic bodies), as a divine art, it 
can also, not incorrectly, be given the name of wisdom… Teleology (and, 
though it, physicotheology) gives abundant proof in experience of this 
artistic wisdom. But from it no inference is allowed to the moral wisdom 
of the author of the world, for the natural law and the moral law require 
principles of entirely different kinds… the proof of the existence of such a 
being [viz., a moral being] can be none other than a moral proof.  
(MpVT, AA 8:256n) 
This concludes my discussion of Kant’s views on the practical postulates from 1790 to 
1797 (the period between the publication of the Critique of the Power of Judgment and 
the Metaphysics of morals). In this section I tried to draw attention to two things: Kant’s 
growing ambivalence toward the postulate of immortality (as borne out especially in the 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and his unpublished reflections) and 
Kant’s continued experimentation regarding the relationship between the physico-
theological argument and the postulate of the existence of God (as borne out in his 
unpublished reflections and On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy).  
Finally, it should be realized that Kant commits himself explicitly to both the 
postulate of the existence of God and the postulate of immortality as late as 1796 (in On 
the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy). However, as we shall see in the 
final section of this paper, evidence of Kant’s break with these arguments (or with the 
postulate of the existence of God, anyway) can be found as early as his Metaphysics of 
morals, published less than five years after On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials 
in Theodicy.  
V.  
The Final Chapter of the Metaphysics of morals: the Final Chapter of the 
Practical Postulates Kant’s Metaphysics of morals originally was published in two parts, 
the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. The Doctrine of Right appeared 
sometime around January of 1797. The Doctrine of Virtue appeared sometime around 
August of the same year. The Metaphysics of morals, which combines these two works, 
appeared in 1798 with some minor revisions. The revisions were mainly to the Doctrine 
of Right and do not concern us here.  For the purposes of this paper, my interests lie in xxxvi
the final chapter of the Metaphysics of Morals, which is also the final chapter of the 
Doctrine of Virtue. This chapter is called the “Doctrine of the methods of ethics.” It is in 
parallel with the “Doctrine of the method of pure practical reason,” the final chapter of 
the Critique of Practical Reason.  
 In the “Doctrine of the methods of ethics,” Kant tells us how to teach some of the 
basics of ethics to children. He envisions a pupil and a teacher in a conversation. The 
teacher does not lecture to the student about abstract moral truths or applied ethics. But 
the teacher also does not engage the student in a dialogue of equals, for the student must 
be guided. The teacher presents the pupil with questions and, in doing so, the teacher 
guides and gives form to the pupil’s thoughts, thereby becoming “the midwife of the 
pupil’s thoughts” (MS, AA 6:478). Kant writes out a fragment of what he imagines would 
take place in such an interview. The following passage is taken from the end: 
Teacher: …even if we are conscious of such a good and active will in us, 
by virtue of which we consider ourselves worthy (or at least not unworthy) 
of happiness, can we base on this a sure hope of happiness? 
Pupil: No, not on this alone. For it is not always within our power to 
provide ourselves with happiness, and the course of nature does not of 
itself conform with merit. Our good fortune in life (our welfare in general) 
depends, rather, on circumstances that are far from all being in our control. 
So our happiness always remains a wish that cannot become a hope, 
unless some other power is added. 
Teacher: Has reason, in fact, any grounds of its own for assuming the 
existence of such a power, which apportions happiness in accordance with 
a human being’s merit or guilt, a power ordering the whole of nature and 
governing the world with supreme wisdom? That is, any grounds for 
believing in God? 
Pupil: Yes. For we see in the works of nature, which we can judge, a 
wisdom so widespread and profound that we can explain it to ourselves 
only by the inexpressibly great art of a creator of the world. And with 
regard to the moral order, which is the highest adornment of the world, we 
have reason to expect a no less wise regime, such that if we do not make 
ourselves unworthy of happiness, by violating our duty, we can also hope 
to share in happiness.  
(MS, AA 6:482) 
Now I want to spend some time with this passage because it is important to 
realize exactly what is going on. The teacher brings the pupil around to the concept of 
justice. Justice is understood here in terms of moral desert. Happiness should be meted 
out in accordance with worthiness for that happiness. To behave morally just is to make 
oneself worthy of happiness. These ideas should be familiar by now. A world in which 
everyone receives his or her moral desert is a world in which the highest good is realized.  
At this point, the teacher asks the pupil whether we can be certain that good 
behavior brings with it in itself a guarantee of happiness (and bad behavior one of 
unhappiness). The pupil responds that it does not. The pupil points out that our happiness 
depends on factors that are beyond our control. Thus, the pupil concludes, unless there is 
a God, we can have no grounds for hoping that happiness and worthiness for that 
happiness will go together in the world. However, the teacher presses on, asking whether 
there are any grounds for believing in God and, therefore, in the real possibility of a 
world in which there is such a distribution of happiness. 
We might expect Kant’s pupil here to begin talking about the duty to promote the 
highest good. That is, the argument we would expect given Kant’s discussion of the 
practical postulates is something like this: there is a duty to realize this kind of 
distribution, so it must be possible. It is a real possibility only if there is a God. So in 
order rationally to fulfill the duty to realize this kind of distribution, belief in God is 
required.  
However, that is not what the pupil answers. Instead, the pupil appeals to the 
physico-theological argument: the pupil says that the purposiveness we observe in the 
world warrants inferring (indeed, can be explained only by inferring) the existence of a 
God. Then the pupil winds things up by arguing that there is no reason to suppose that 
this wise and benevolent God, whose existence can be inferred from the physico-
theological argument, does not govern also the moral sphere. Thus, the physico-
theological argument gives us a presumptive ground for hoping that the distribution of 
happiness required for the highest good is a real possibility. 
In other words, Kant has turned on its head his earlier line of reasoning. In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, we saw Kant criticizing the physico-theological argument for 
the existence of God but nonetheless arguing that we ought to believe in the existence of 
God on the basis of the practical postulates.  In the Critique of the Power of xxxvii
Judgment, we saw Kant again pointing out the limitations of the physico-theological 
argument–but we also saw him saying that it can bolster the practical postulates. Finally, 
by the last chapter of the Metaphysics of morals, we see Kant resting the hope that was 
justified previously by appeal to the practical postulates–that is, hope in the real 
possibility of the distribution of happiness required for the realization of the highest 
good–entirely on the physico-theological argument. 
What can we conclude from this? Can we conclude that by the time of the 
Metaphysics of morals Kant had given up on the line of reasoning in the practical 
postulates and had become complacent about the shortcomings he earlier had found in the 
physico-theological argument? If the passage cited above were the only one we had to go 
on, this conclusion, I think, would be unwarranted. For one thing, Kant does not 
explicitly say in this passage that he has foresworn the line of reasoning in the practical 
postulates. For another, it must be remembered that this is part of an imaginary dialogue 
between a teacher and a young pupil: perhaps Kant simply thought that the physico-
theological argument is more appropriate for that context. However, there is more. 
In the conclusion of the “Doctrine of the methods of ethics,” Kant advances a 
novel argument for the existence of God. It occurs in the following passage: 
The ground on which a human being is to think of all his duties in keeping 
with this formal aspect of religion (their relation to a divine will given a 
priori) is only subjectively logical. That is to say, we cannot very well 
make obligation (moral constraint) intuitive for ourselves without thereby 
thinking of another’s will, namely God’s (of which reason in giving 
universal laws is only the spokesman). –But this duty with regard to 
God… is a duty of a human being to himself, that is, it is not objective, 
any obligation to perform certain services for another, but only subjective, 
for the sake of strengthening the moral incentive in our own lawgiving 
reason.  
(MS, AA 6:487) 
This argument, like the practical postulate, is a moral argument for existence of God. But 
there is an important difference between this argument and the practical postulate for the 
existence of God. As we have seen, the practical postulate for the existence of God gets 
off the ground by virtue of the claim that the existence of God is necessary to guarantee 
the real possibility of a state of affairs that the moral law commands us to promote. The 
moral argument here, by way of contrast, gets off the ground by virtue of an appeal to 
human psychology. Kant thinks that if we reflect on the concept of obligation, we will be 
able to make it intuitive to ourselves only if we conceive of it as coming from some 
external source. But the only possible external source for the moral law is God. So in 
order to make rational carrying out the dictates of any obligation, we ought to bring 
ourselves to believe in the existence of God as the obligation-giver–as the lawgiver. The 
crucial difference between these two arguments is that in the practical postulate for the 
existence of God, Kant is arguing for God qua author of the laws of nature; in the present 
argument, Kant is arguing for God qua author of the laws of morality. 
 Thus it may be seen that Kant bypasses the practical postulate for the existence of 
God not once but twice in this section of the Metaphysics of morals. Moreover, in its 
stead he articulates an argument he previously had conjoined with it and a novel 
argument that has a similar starting point (morality). However, the decisive evidence of 
Kant’s move away from the practical postulate for the existence of God comes in the 
Opus postumum, where Kant tells us, “there is only one practically sufficient argument 
for faith in one God… knowledge of all human duties as (tanquam) divine 
commands” (OP, AA 22:127). Kant makes two claims here. First, he claims that there is 
exactly one argument that is practically sufficient for faith in God: he claims that such an 
argument exists, and he claims that this argument is unique. Second, he tells us that this 
argument involves knowledge of human duties as divine commands: he tells us what this 
argument is–the one we just explored from the end of the Metaphysics of morals. So here 
we have Kant claiming explicitly that this argument–the argument involving knowledge 
of human duties as divine commands and not the practical postulate for the existence of 
God–is the only argument that is practically sufficient for faith in God. Needless to say, 
this entails that the practical postulate is insufficient. 
 Indeed, Kant returns again and again to this argument about knowledge of human 
duties as divine commands in the Opus postumum. Here are a few representative 
passages: 
The principle of the knowledge of all human duties as (tanquam) 
universally valid commands, that is, in the quality of a highest, holy and 
powerful law-giver, raises the subject thought thereby to the rank of a 
single, powerful being: That is, the existence of such a being cannot be 
concluded from the idea which we ourselves think of God, but yet we may 
infer as [if] there were such a being...  
      (OP, AA 21:20) 
The reality of the concept of freedom can, thus, only be presented and 
proved indirectly, through an intermediary principle, rather than directly 
(immediately). Likewise the proposition: "There is a God," namely, in 
human, moral practical reason, [as] a determination of one's actions in the 
knowledge of human duties as (as if) divine commands...     
      (OP, AA 21:30) 
In it, that is, the idea of God as a moral being, we live, move and have one 
being; motivated through the knowledge of our duties as divine 
commands.  
(OP, AA 22:118) 
…the supersensible is not an object of possible experience… but merely a 
judgment by analogy–that is, to the relational concept of a synthetic 
judgment, namely, to think  all human duties as if divine commands and in 
relation to a person.  
(OP, AA 22:120) 
It can be seen from this that Kant is moving forward with the moral argument for the 
existence of God that he developed in the final section of the Metaphysics of morals and, 
more, that he has moved away from the postulate of the existence of God that he 
embraced in the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason and the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment. 
 I would like to close by noting that in addition to developing this new moral 
argument for the existence of God, in the Opus postumum Kant begins to develop an 
argument to prove the uniqueness of God. The uniqueness argument begins with the idea 
that God is all obligating but never obligated. If there were two such beings, then either 
neither would be all obligating or at least one would be obligated. In either case, there is a 
contradiction, so we may conclude that there is only one being that is all obligating but 
never obligated. Here is a representative passage in which Kant sketches this argument: 
A moral being who would be thought as obligating, but as obligated by no 
other, would be God. If such exists, then he is a single God; for to think of 
several of them is a self-contradiction, since they would be thought in a 
relation of obligation to one another.    
      (OP, AA 22:124) 
This is not the place to explore this argument in detail. I note merely that Kant’s interest 
in his new moral argument for the existence of God as a replacement for the practical 
postulate might have been bolstered by the fact that it dovetails so nicely with this 
uniqueness argument.
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existence of God, which, as noted above, is discussed at length and even given its own 
section).
 Here is the quotation from the footnote: “[t]hat is, the proposition, “Make the highest xxxi
possible good in this world your own final end,” is a synthetic proposition a priori which 
is introduced by the moral law itself…” (RGV, AA 6:07n, my emphasis).
 THE CONTENTS OF THIS NOTE HAVE BEEN DELETED BECAUSE THEY xxxii
CONTAIN POTENTIALLY IDENTIFYING INFORMATION.
 In the K2-Heinze passage Kant introduces also the argument that immortality of the xxxiii
soul is needed in order fully to develop our moral predispositions (V-Met-K2/Heinze, AA 
28:765-6). This seems to be a paraphrase of the argument for the postulate of immortality 
that we find in the Critique of Practical Reason. 
 For a small cross section of similar reflections from this period, see: R2503 (Refl, xxxiv
AA 16:395-6), R2793 (Refl, AA 16:513-5), R6349 (Refl, AA 18:674), R6351 (Refl, AA 
18:677-8), R6356 (Refl, AA 18:681-2), R6358 (Refl, AA 18:682-5) and R7316 (Refl, AA 
19:313-5).
 THE CONTENTS OF THIS NOTE HAVE BEEN DELETED BECAUSE THEY xxxv
CONTAIN POTENTIALLY IDENTIFYING INFORMATION. 
 Relying here on the translator’s introduction in the Cambridge blue series.xxxvi
 THE CONTENTS OF THIS NOTE HAVE BEEN DELETED BECAUSE THEY xxxvii
CONTAIN POTENTIALLY IDENTIFYING INFORMATION.
